The Road to War in Iraq
The Bush Administration waged war effectively in Iraq, but its diplomacy before the war was a disaster, and its planning for the post-war seems to have been problematic. On March 17 I posted links to some material on pre-war diplomacy, here: "What went wrong? Why didn't we get the second U.N. resolution?"
The current issue of Foreign Affairs has an article on pre-war diplomacy by James Rubin, and has put the full text to the web, here: "Stumbling Into War". The author is a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and was a Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997 to 2000.
- "...What went wrong? Why, when the leader of the free world went to war with a brutal and hated dictator, did so many countries refuse to take America's side? How much collateral damage was caused in the process? And what lessons can be learned from this debacle? After extensive debriefings of key participants in Europe and at the United Nations, as well as of a number of informed American diplomats, some important lessons from the recent crisis are starting to emerge.
"First, the fact that Washington's justification for war seemed to shift as occasion demanded led many outside observers to question the Bush administration's motives and to doubt it would ever accept Iraq's peaceful disarmament. Second, the United States failed to synchronize its military and diplomatic tracks. The deployment of American forces in the Middle East seemed to determine American policy, not the other way around, and diplomatic imperatives were given short shrift. Third, the failure to anticipate Saddam's decision to comply partially with UN demands proved disastrous to Washington's strategy. Fourth, the belated effort to achieve a second Security Council resolution could still have succeeded, had the United States been willing to compromise by extending the deadline by just a few weeks. But such a compromise was not forthcoming, which leads to the last lesson: the Bush administration's rhetoric and style alienated rather than persuaded key officials and foreign constituencies, especially in light of Washington's two-year history of scorn for international institutions and agreements..."
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