Why public administrators should know

Why public administrators should know something about opportunity costs

The Economist had a review of a new book on public security in the Oct 16 issue - Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is an expert in computer security writing for a general audience, and evaluating the suite of security measures to which we are increasingly subject. The Economist gave it a good review (I can't link to it because it's "premium content").

One of Schneier's points, summarized in the review, is that id checks at building entrances, may not be very helpful - in fact, may be a counter-productive - because of the opportunity costs (and psychological effects) they entail:

"...Many of the measures introduced and proposed in the past two years fail Mr Schneier's tests [tests good security systems should pass, described in the book - Ben]. Checking IDs in large office buildings means little, because fake IDs can easily be obtained by under-aged drinkers, let alone by evil-doers. Moreover, the need to check IDs may prevent security guards from noticing other activities, and the whole process may lead to a false sense of security, thus making things worse, not better..."