The Custom-House

"Time is money" Craig Newmark

"Time is money"

Craig Newmark links to evidence that people who make more speed more. Many of the speeders interviewed report that "time is money."

Offshore outsourcing has little effect

Offshore outsourcing has little effect on U.S. jobs?

Kash, at Angry Bear summarizes, and links to, an Institute for International Economics report that finds little offshore outsourcing impact on the U.S. job market: "In general, the report does not turn up any evidence the offshore outsourcing is responsible for significant job losses in any particular industry or occupation."

Unfounded fear of competition Tyler

Unfounded fear of competition

Tyler Cowen reports on how and why French auction firms survived the relaxation of barriers to international competition, and the entry of Christie's and Southeby's into the market.

The "small state" advantage in

The "small state" advantage in Congress

Brian Knight reports on the existence, sources, and efficiency implications of the small state advantage in Congress in a new National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper. From the abstract:

"While representation in the U.S. House is based upon state population, each state has an equal number (two) of U.S. Senators. Thus, relative to the state delegations in the U.S. House, small population states are provided disproportionate bargaining power in the U.S. Senate.

This paper provides new evidence on the role of this small state bargaining power in the distribution of federal funds using data on projects earmarked in appropriations bills between 1995 and 2003.

Relative to earmarks secured in House appropriations bills, Senate earmarks exhibit a small state advantage that is both economically and statistically significant. The paper also examines two theoretically-motivated channels through which this small state advantage operates: increased proposal power through appropriations committee representation and the lower cost of securing votes due to smaller federal tax shares. Taken together, these two channels explain over 80 percent of the measured small state bias. Finally, a welfare analysis demonstrates the inefficiency of the measured small state bias."

See "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate" (NBER Working paper w10385).

International trade and externalities

Michael Margolis and Jason Shogren point out ("How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control", Resources for the Future discussion paper 04-07) that international trade itself may be a source of negative externalities. Unpleasant invasive species (think zebra muscles in the Great Lakes) may come in the cargo, or in ship ballast water; the movement of cargo may create pollution externalities; trade activity may provide opportunities for the movement of contraband or terrorists. From the abstract:

"Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff..."

The problem is that in a world with interest groups, and interest group contributions to politicians, "The invasive-species tariff is set higher than it would be if government were independent of rent-seeking contributors." "The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-goods protection are formidable."

While Suharto was stealing all

While Suharto was stealing all his money, Indonesia was growing lickety-split

I posted Transparency International's list of top kleptocrats below. Suharto of Indonesia leads the list, allegedly stealing something between $15 and $35 billion. But I also note that Indonesia grew quite a bit under his regime. Indonesia was one of four ASEAN countries that doubled real income per person between 1980 and 1995. (Michael Sarel, Growth and Productivity in ASEAN countries, IMF working paper, 1997).

I'm not familiar with the details of the Indonesia economy during this period, but I wonder if Suharto is an example of one of Mancur Olson's predatory, rent maximizing, 'warlords' ("Creating the wealth of nations") adopting policies that increase the wealth of the nation, in order to increase his take. It's more lucrative to steal from the rich than from the poor.

Tyler Cowen buckles on his

Tyler Cowen buckles on his armor and sallies forth to UNESCO

Cowen appears to be heading over to France for a meeting on cultural diversity.

Core Kerry economic team

Louis Uchitelle reports on the key members of Kerry's economic team in tomorrow's New York Times:A Kerry Team, a Clinton Touch.

"THEY are a motley team, the four members of John Kerry's war room for economic policy.

Remember Roger C. Altman, the high-ranking Treasury official in the early Clinton years, forced out for being too loyal to his boss in the Whitewater investigation? He is one of them. Gene Sperling, a White House insider in all eight Clinton years, is another. Then there are two less-known 30-somethings: Jason Furman, a Harvard-trained economist... and Sarah Bianchi, who was Al Gore's policy adviser in 2000 and is now Mr. Kerry's. Both got their start in the Clinton White House, as young aides barely out of college...

...Even so, the fixes that Mr. Kerry and his core economic advisers are beginning to offer are clearly rooted in Clinton economics, which is resolutely centrist. Fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction, hallmarks of the Clinton years, are bedrock orthodoxy in the Kerry camp, too.

So is faith in the private sector's powers to generate prosperity. Job creation will come from corporate America, not government, once the right incentives and subsidies are in place, the war room says. In fact, the Clinton-era god of deficit reduction and private-sector supremacy is also worshiped in the Kerry camp...."

Late 20th Century Kleptocrats Transparency

Late 20th Century Kleptocrats

Transparency International reports on the top ten kleptocrats of the late 20th Century:

1. Mohamed Suharto President of Indonesia from 1967-98: US$ 15 to 35 billion
2. Ferdinand Marcos President of the Philippines from 1972-86 US$ 5 to 10 billion
3. Mobutu Sese Seko President of Zaire from 1965-97 US$ 5 billion
4. Sani Abacha President of Nigeria from 1993-98 US$ 2 to 5 billion
5. Slobodan Milosevic President of Serbia/Yugoslavia from 1989-2000 US$ 1 billion
6. Jean-Claude Duvalier President of Haiti from 1971-86 US$300 to 800 million
7. Alberto Fujimori President of Peru from 1990-2000 US$ 600 million
8. Pavlo Lazarenko Prime Minister of Ukraine from 1996-97 US$ 114 to 200 million
9. Arnoldo Alem�n President of Nicaragua from 1997-2002 US$ 100 million
10. Joseph Estrada President of the Philippines from 1998-2001 US$ 78 to 80 million"

The list is part of the press release prepared to draw attention to Transparency International's new Global Corruption Report 2004 Brendan I. Koerner explains how Suharto reached the top of his field in Slate: "How Did Suharto Steal $35 Billion? Cronyism 101."

What can you tell about

What can you tell about a state by the assets it exempts from bankruptcy proceedings?

Scheherazade reads the character of a state in the assets it exempts from bankruptcy proceedings.