A country that imposes tariffs on imports deters supplies from abroad, increases the prices paid by its consumers, and increases profits for its producers.
Sometimes, developed countries will give poor countries a break on tariffs, allowing some exports from these countries to enter at reduced tariff rates. Producers in the poor country would enjoy the higher prices in the developed country, without paying the higher tariffs required from other foreign suppliers. This "preferential access" can encourage the location of industry and the creation of jobs in the poor country.
The U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), is an instance of this sort of tariff break. Last week the Boston Globe carried a story (by Carter Dougherty) on the impact of AGOA on Lesotho. The thrust of the story was that AGOA has been good for Lesotho, creating industry and jobs, but that these will be lost if a key provision of AGOA is not extended.
In general, the potential impacts of preferential tariff arrangements are more complex. Vernon Topp, of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), outlines the potential downsides in "Are trade preferences helpful in advancing economic development?" (I appreciate Peter Gallagher letting me know about Topp's paper.) Topp is really skeptical about the use of these preferences. Key elements of his critique:
- The preferences tend to be underutilized. Perhaps because the costs of learning about them, meeting their conditions (for example, limits on foreign content), and working with them, are often greater than the benefits.
- Poor country producers get a high price for their exports to the developed country. The high price for the exports would attract poor country resources into the production of that good. If the country puts a disproportionate number of its industrial eggs in a single basket, it may become more vulnerable to economic shocks.
- The people who benefit from the preference are likely to be the people who own the fixed resources needed to compete in the industry at the time the preference becomes available. If the land that can be used is in fixed supply, or the licenses needed to compete are in fixed supply, the owners of these inputs should receive the bulk of the benefits. New entrants would have to buy access to these fixed resources in order to enter the business. Their potential future profits would be incorporated into the price they pay for entry to the business. The benefits from the program go to the people who were in when the program was set up. People who buy in later pay for the future benefits they will receive.
- Note that the capitalization of the benefits of the preferences into the land, increase its market price and increase the cost of land to the nation's other industries. The increased costs could reduce the competitiveness of these industries in other export markets, and reduce national diversification even more.
- The firms that are receiving the artificially high price for the export good would have relatively weak incentives to keep their costs down. Firms that might not be able to compete profitably at world prices may be drawn into the business. The poor countries high cost producers would not be able to compete outside of the protected market of the preference granting importer.
- Poor workers are unlikely to be beneficiaries of these programs. Only the poor who own land or capital will benefit. Other poor will only benefit if the "direct beneficiaries" of the program buy consumption goods and services from the poor with the additional income they earn from the preferences. The benefits of this "trickle down" effect will be even smaller if the owners of the capital and land live in other countries and spend their income at home.
With respect to this last point, the Globe story suggests that many workers in Lesotho benefit more directly from AGOA's tariff preferences:
"If the fabric rule is not extended, people like Chen's employee Litabe will feel the worst pinch. Litabe earns about $89 per month sewing labels, while others in the factory make as much as $121. Though measly by American standards, the job gives Litabe an annual income of $1,068, roughly double what the World Bank calculated as Lesotho's per capita income in 2002.
About 52,000 other people in Lesotho enjoy similar income levels thanks to AGOA..."
Rethabile Masilo commented on a post of mine last week, and suggested the same thing:
"A lot of people in Lesotho have jobs because of the legislation and the bringing down of trade tariffs. These same people today are able to go home and face their families, because today they can buy basic foodstuffs and so on. These same people are,on the other hand, often maltreated and subjected to bad working conditions by factory owners that are in Lesotho precisely because of Agoa. It's hard to embrace Agoa, yet harder, even, to dismiss it and seek its withdrawal."
The first point above noted that the complexity of the tariff and preference arrangements might pose a barrier to their use. The Globe story suggests that the cost of using these provisions may be high:
"...American officials note that the government of Lesotho played an important role in making AGOA work. It built factory space that companies could then lease, and by working closely with the US Customs service to follow detailed American import regulations.
But the presence in Lesotho of experienced managers like Chen was crucial, because they understood the garment sector, which is governed by a Byzantine array of rules, and which requires timely sourcing of raw materials and punctual delivery to demanding customers..."
Look at the role of foreign direct investment:
" Many Taiwanese began small-scale manufacturing in Lesotho two decades ago. Chen arrived in 1989.
When the US law came into force, she was able to seize the opportunity in a matter of months. She merged her company into the operations of Carry Wealth Holding, a Hong Kong-based company that provided capital to expander her operations in Lesotho. Chen soon nearly quadrupled the size of her factory in Lesotho..."