The terrorist bomber won't always get through, but the odds are good that, despite our best efforts, he'll (or she'll) get through once and a while. The damage will be reduced if we've thought ahead. This goes for port security.
Jonathan Haveman is a trade economist. Here's another input into the port security production function, from his publication, In Search of Greater Policy Vision for Port Planning and Security (February 2004):
There are big questions regarding port security that are not being asked. Perhaps the most important is: What is the most effective way to reduce the likelihood of an attack on a U.S. port?
Here, there is a pair of alternatives: eliminating vulnerabilities, as current policies do, or implementing a good recovery plan, which current policies fail to do. Although these are alternatives, they are not exclusive. The most effective protection will likely involve a combination of the two. This is so, because in reality, it is unlikely that all vulnerable points will be covered. Given that there is always some risk remaining, the most cost-effective means for reducing risk further may be through reducing the attractiveness of the target.
By way of example, suppose that the ports on the San Pedro Bay were put out of commission by an explosion for six months. In the absence of a well thought-out recovery plan, much of the trade destined for U.S. shores would sit idly by as flows were haphazardly redirected. With a plan in place for this eventuality, ships far out to sea could easily redirect as soon as the event occurred, reducing the adjustment cost associated with the port closure. As the cost of a port closure is reduced, the appeal of an attack on the port is similarly reduced. Pursuing both sides of the coin would seem the prudent approach to reducing the likelihood and resulting impact of an attack on a U.S. port.
In order to most efficiently allocate the limited resources devoted to port security, spending should be focused on effectively reducing the likelihood of an event. This means paying attention to both increasing the difficulty of assaulting a port and mitigating the costs of an event after the fact. Coming to this conclusion requires greater vision than is currently evidenced in current port security planning.
I'm not so sure that this would deter an attack on a port. This probably wouldn't affect the emotional impact of a successful attack; I think that impact is the terrorist's main objective. But it would reduce the economic costs of an attack, and contribute to the economy's resiliency in the face of the terrorist threat.
I learned about Haveman's work from Daniel Drezner, who recommends: "An excellent primer on port security can be found in Jon D. Haveman, Howard J. Shatz, and Ernesto A. Vilchis (2005) "U.S. Port Security Policy after 9/11: Overview and Evaluation", Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 2: No. 4, Article 1."
A subscription is required for access to this. Here is a PowerPoint presentation by these authors on this issue: An Overview of Port Security Programs .
Revised: title change FEb 27.
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