Bush came to office hoping to advance a vigorous free trade agenda, and "skeptical of activist IMF intervention in emerging market financial crises, foreign exchange market intervention, and multilateral development assistance."
But Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin argue that it ultimately pursued a foreign economic policy that was fundamentally similar to that of previous administrations: International Economic Policy: Was There a Bush Doctrine?
While many political scientists and diplomatic historians see the Bush presidency as a distinctive epoch in American foreign policy, we argue that there was no Bush Doctrine in foreign economic policy. The Bush administration sought to advance a free trade agenda but could not avoid the use of protectionist measures at home -- just like its predecessors. It foreswore bailouts of financially-distressed developing countries yet ultimately yielded to the perceived necessity of lending assistance -- just like its predecessors. Not unlike previous presidents, President Bush also maintained a stance of benign neglect toward the country's current account deficit. These continuities reflect long-standing structures and deeply embedded interests that the administration found impossible to resist.
The Administration had to go to Congress to get negotiating authority, linked trade policy with other foreign policy and security objectives, compromised on its opposition to bailouts to try to protect foreign democracies, took some protectionist steps to garner votes in Congress and to win elections, and took other steps to head off worse Congressional proposals.
Security concerns shaped our choice of partners for bilateral commercial agreements:
...Zoellick envisioned using the prospect of bilateral trade agreements to assist allies in the war effort, denying potential trade benefits to countries that did not cooperate in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most notable example was the successful pursuit of a free trade agreement with Australia (which sent troops to Iraq) and the rejection of any such agreement with New Zealand (which did not support the war).
Of course there will be some differences in the policy of the next administration, but:
We see the next administration as having to address many of the same problems subject to the same constraints.... Continuity will therefore remain the rule.
Brad DeLong points to the ways trade policy may be shaped by other policy objectives in the coming administration. He thinks the U.S. Trade Representative position will be unusually important in the Obama Administration (Nominee-Designate-Leekees). He thinks the position will...
...turn out to be a much more important job in the Obama-Biden administration than people recognize. Trade agreements are a principal way that we deploy our foreign policy soft power. And trade sanctions are, I think, going to be a principal tool in the construction of the system of global governance to fight global warming.
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