The Fortress of Ticonderoga in Upstate New York: it no longer contributes to national security. Source: Vintage Views of New York.
During the Cold War the United States developed a suite of export control and visa requirements to limit the spread of sensitive technologies to hostile powers.
But, the National Research Council says, that was then and this is now: Beyond "Fortress America" National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World. It's time for reform. You can read the report online; here are key extracts from the executive summary:
The export controls and visa regulations that were crafted to meet conditions the United States faced over five decades ago now quietly undermine our national security and our national economic wellbeing. The entire system of export controls needs to be restructured and the visa controls on credentialed foreign scientists and engineers should be further streamlined to serve the nation’s current economic and security challenges.
During the Cold War, the United States was the international center of scientific knowledge and
technology. U.S. national security depended on maintaining the technological superiority of our military forces against the quantitatively superior military forces of the Soviet bloc. To help ensure its superiority, the United States established a system of national security controls to prevent the leakage of military-related goods and technologies, including so-called dual-use technologies that could give military advantages to our adversaries. This system was codified in export, visa, and classification laws and regulations. In addition, the U.S. and our allies forged multilateral controls on the international transfer of militarily sensitive goods and technologies. While far from perfect, this system met the needs of the Cold War reality of a bipolar power struggle with a known and well-characterized enemy.
Today, world conditions are very different. Our adversaries are diffuse; they range from sovereign states to small terrorist cells without state affiliation. There is no longer a consensus in the western alliance about who its adversaries are or how they should be contained. Many of the most important technologies for continued military superiority originate in the commercial sector rather than in the military sector. Furthermore, such technological capabilities increasingly arise from scientific and engineering research taking place around the world, not just in the United States. Today, for example, the United States has lost its dominance in fields such as semi-conductor manufacturing. Several countries now rival the United States in creating a climate that encourages and rewards business and scientific innovation. As economic conditions have improved in China, India, and other countries, many young people who would have come to the United States to study or work in science and technology now opt to stay home for their education or to return to their home country after graduate school in the U. S. All these changes mean that American security and prosperity now depend on maintaining active engagement with worldwide developments in science and technology, and with the global economy.
While the United States remains a world leader in advanced science and technology, it no longer
dominates; it is now among the leaders. We are increasingly interdependent with the rest of the world. What is the United States doing to reap benefits from its increased interdependence? Instead of promoting engagement, the United States is required by our current system of controls to turn inward.
Our visa controls have made it more difficult or less attractive for talented foreign professionals to come and learn what is great about this country, or to stay and help grow the American economy. Our export controls retard both the U.S. and its allies from sharing access to military technology, and handicap American business from competing globally.
In the post-9/11 world, even if we could accept the costs associated with mistakenly turning away some of the brightest international students or accept the forfeit of some business growth opportunities in the interest of national and homeland security, these are not the only outcomes of current policies.
Such policies also weaken relations with allies, reduce the capability and strength of America’s defense industrial base, and help to create foreign competitors that diminish U.S. market share in critical technologies.
These unintended consequences arise from policies that were crafted for an earlier era. In the name of maintaining superiority, the United States now runs the risk of becoming less competitive and less prosperous; we run the risk of actually weakening our national security. The Cold War mentality of “Fortress America” cripples our ability to confront the very real dangers of altered world conditions.
During the Cold War, the United States was the international center of scientific knowledge and
technology. U.S. national security depended on maintaining the technological superiority of our military forces against the quantitatively superior military forces of the Soviet bloc. To help ensure its superiority, the United States established a system of national security controls to prevent the leakage of military-related goods and technologies, including so-called dual-use technologies that could give military advantages to our adversaries. This system was codified in export, visa, and classification laws and regulations. In addition, the U.S. and our allies forged multilateral controls on the international transfer of militarily sensitive goods and technologies. While far from perfect, this system met the needs of the Cold War reality of a bipolar power struggle with a known and well-characterized enemy.
Today, world conditions are very different. Our adversaries are diffuse; they range from sovereign states to small terrorist cells without state affiliation. There is no longer a consensus in the western alliance about who its adversaries are or how they should be contained. Many of the most important technologies for continued military superiority originate in the commercial sector rather than in the military sector. Furthermore, such technological capabilities increasingly arise from scientific and engineering research taking place around the world, not just in the United States. Today, for example, the United States has lost its dominance in fields such as semi-conductor manufacturing. Several countries now rival the United States in creating a climate that encourages and rewards business and scientific innovation. As economic conditions have improved in China, India, and other countries, many young people who would have come to the United States to study or work in science and technology now opt to stay home for their education or to return to their home country after graduate school in the U. S. All these changes mean that American security and prosperity now depend on maintaining active engagement with worldwide developments in science and technology, and with the global economy.
While the United States remains a world leader in advanced science and technology, it no longer
dominates; it is now among the leaders. We are increasingly interdependent with the rest of the world. What is the United States doing to reap benefits from its increased interdependence? Instead of promoting engagement, the United States is required by our current system of controls to turn inward.
Our visa controls have made it more difficult or less attractive for talented foreign professionals to come and learn what is great about this country, or to stay and help grow the American economy. Our export controls retard both the U.S. and its allies from sharing access to military technology, and handicap American business from competing globally.
In the post-9/11 world, even if we could accept the costs associated with mistakenly turning away some of the brightest international students or accept the forfeit of some business growth opportunities in the interest of national and homeland security, these are not the only outcomes of current policies.
Such policies also weaken relations with allies, reduce the capability and strength of America’s defense industrial base, and help to create foreign competitors that diminish U.S. market share in critical technologies.
These unintended consequences arise from policies that were crafted for an earlier era. In the name of maintaining superiority, the United States now runs the risk of becoming less competitive and less prosperous; we run the risk of actually weakening our national security. The Cold War mentality of “Fortress America” cripples our ability to confront the very real dangers of altered world conditions.
Recommendations:
Recommendation 1. The President should restructure the export control process within the federal government so that the balancing of interests can be achieved more efficiently and harm can be prevented to the nation’s security and technology base; in addition to promoting U.S. economic competitiveness.
Restructuring the export control process does not involve abandoning all export controls. Rather, the committee recommends that two policy changes and two structural changes be made to retain export controls while shedding the largest obstacles to an efficient system. With these changesneeded implemented in an expedient manner, the United States will stem the loss of technological and economic competitiveness and begin to benefit from carefully targeted and calibrated controls that reflect and meet current challenges that the country faces in protecting both our national security and our economic well-being.
Recommendation 2. The President should direct that executive authorities under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act be administered to assure the scientific and technological competitiveness of the United States, which is a prerequisite for both national security and economic prosperity.
Recommendation 3. The President should maintain and enhance access to the reservoir of human talent from foreign sources to strengthen the U.S. science and technology base.
Traditionally, the United States had to worry about science and technology flowing out of the country. In today’s conditions, the U.S. must make sure that advanced science and technology will continue to flow into the country. For this reason, the U.S. visa regulations as applied to credentialed foreign scientists should ensure that the U.S. has access to the best talent. Science and engineering degreeholders who prefer, after graduation, to work in the U.S. should have ready access to permission for long-term stays. Granting this access for highly trained technical and scientific personnel is an important way of augmenting a critical segment of the workforce. The U.S. cannot protect U.S. jobs by denying entry to foreign professionals; jobs will simply go abroad. It is important for both the national security and economic prosperity to maintain the flow of human talent into the United States.
Restructuring the export control process does not involve abandoning all export controls. Rather, the committee recommends that two policy changes and two structural changes be made to retain export controls while shedding the largest obstacles to an efficient system. With these changesneeded implemented in an expedient manner, the United States will stem the loss of technological and economic competitiveness and begin to benefit from carefully targeted and calibrated controls that reflect and meet current challenges that the country faces in protecting both our national security and our economic well-being.
Recommendation 2. The President should direct that executive authorities under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act be administered to assure the scientific and technological competitiveness of the United States, which is a prerequisite for both national security and economic prosperity.
Recommendation 3. The President should maintain and enhance access to the reservoir of human talent from foreign sources to strengthen the U.S. science and technology base.
Traditionally, the United States had to worry about science and technology flowing out of the country. In today’s conditions, the U.S. must make sure that advanced science and technology will continue to flow into the country. For this reason, the U.S. visa regulations as applied to credentialed foreign scientists should ensure that the U.S. has access to the best talent. Science and engineering degreeholders who prefer, after graduation, to work in the U.S. should have ready access to permission for long-term stays. Granting this access for highly trained technical and scientific personnel is an important way of augmenting a critical segment of the workforce. The U.S. cannot protect U.S. jobs by denying entry to foreign professionals; jobs will simply go abroad. It is important for both the national security and economic prosperity to maintain the flow of human talent into the United States.
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